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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: AD-
MINISTRATIVE REFORM ON 
THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL 
By Peter A. Donovan-:-
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 
AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
Society has at last awakened to the consequences of the in-
creasing degradation of man's environment. The media have 
publicized the imminent shortage of potable water and food 
supplies, the sudden accretion of toxic wastes in the air, the 
presence of dangerous metals such as mercury in the food chain, 
the increasingly rapid deterioration of the inner cities, the 
psychological and physiological harm which results from con-
stant noise assault and population density, the growing stock-
pile of deadly radioactive wastes, the pollution of soil with 
pesticides and herbicides, and the peril of thermal imbalance. An 
aroused scientific community also has warned society of the 
impending dangers, and many interested scientists have begun 
to study and document the deleterious effects of non-circumspect 
technology upon the environment. These developments, which 
have filtered down into the understanding of the average citizen, 
portray the scope of environmental pollution as a national, and, 
indeed, an international or transnational problem. 
Any attempt to rectify existing environmental abuses and to 
achieve and maintain environmental quality, therefore, must 
necessarily be at least national in scope. This is axiomatic even 
though Congress has declared that the primary responsibility for 
environmental quality rests with state and local governments. 
While all levels of government must coordinate their activities 
in achieving the collective goal, federal example must un-
299 
300 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
doubtedly supply the impetus behind any meaningful national 
achievemen t. 
During the year 1970, the national fight against pollution en-
listed new and potentially powerful weapons. These ranged from 
the enactment of the most important administrative statute 
ever passed by Congress, through subsequent congressional 
legislation and executive reorganization of the federal bureau-
cracy, to initially successful steps in modifying and adapting the 
federal antitrust laws to comport with environmental protection. 
Of particular significance are the administrative reforms. 
On this administrative level, the first environmental develop-
men t during the year 1970 was the formal enactment of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which was signed 
into law by the President on January 1, 1970. This Act declared 
the dual federal objective of restoring and maintaining environ-
mental quality. The Act created in the Executive Office of the 
President a new institution, the Council on Environmental 
Quality, to assist and advise the President in connection with 
environmental programs and the purposes and policies of the Act. 
Congress quickly followed with the passage of the Environ-
mental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, which established the 
Office of Environmental Quality, also within the Executive 
Office of the President, to provide professional and administra-
tive staff in support of the Council. Next came executive re-
organization of the federal bureaucracy to streamline procedures 
and responsibilities. Many conflicting and, in some instances, 
even contradictory duties and policies previously imposed upon 
several agencies of the federal government were eliminated. The 
reorganization plans also created two new agencies. One of these, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is a "super-
agency" to which has been transferred authority over most 
federal environmental protection programs. These reorganiza-
tion plans became effective on October 3, 1970. 
This article surveys these developments at the administrative 
level. Particular emphasis is given to the discussion of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 since this statute may 
justifiably be said to be the fountainhead for federal activity in 
the area of the environment. 
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 
On January 1, 1970, the ~~ti~J1al Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (NEPA) became effoctive.1 Tliis Act is the most impor-
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tant administrative statute ever passed by Congress in the area 
of environmental protection. The Act contains a congressional 
declaration of national environmental policy and imposes both 
substantive and procedural duties on all federal officials and 
agencies to implement its policy. In summary, the stated pur-
poses of the act are 
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment 
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich 
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environ-
mental Quality.2 
Because of its importance and overriding influence on all federal 
activities, NEPA requires careful consideration and analysis. 
A. Purposes and Policies 
It should be noted initially that NEPA declares the national 
environmental policy in broad, sweeping language. Section 
101(a), for example, recognizes the "critical importance of re-
storing and maintaining environmental quality to the overall 
welfare and development of man," and then "declares that it is 
the continuing policy of the Federal Government to use all 
practical means and measures ... in a manner calculated to 
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in protective 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements 
of present and future generations of Americans."3 
Section 101(b)4 carries this thought forward by providing that 
"(i)n order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is 
the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use 
all practical means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, 
functions, programs, and resources" toward certain stated ends.a 
These goals are detailed in the statute as follows: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthe-
tically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
wi thou t degradation, risk to heal th or safety, or other undesirable and 
unintended consequences; 
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(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of 
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's 
amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 6 
Section 101(c) contains the further important declaration that 
"[t]he Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a 
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility 
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the en-
vironment."7 With reference to this section and the provisions 
of the Administrative Procedure Act,8 one commentator has 
suggested that "a private citizen ... should have standing to 
challenge actions and decisions of federal agencies allegedly in 
violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
where the action or decision threatens to have adverse effects 
on the ecosystem in which he resides or in the ecosystem that 
he uses for recreation."9 Although this construction of the 
Act seems desirable, it is not entirely clear that this position is 
supported by the legislative history. A change which occurred 
during the legislative process leading to the enactment of the 
provision appearing as section 101 (c) should be noted. 
NEPA itself is a synthesis of two bills introduced into the 
Senate and House, respectively (S. 1075 and H.R. 6750). Origi-
nally, the Senate version provided that "[t]he Congress recog-
nizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right 
to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsi-
bility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the 
environment."lo This language should be compared with the 
present version which now provides that "each person should 
enjoy a healthful environment." According to the House man-
agers of the bill, the change was made "because of doubt on the 
part of the House conferees wi th respect to the legal scope of the 
original Senate provision."ll Apparently, the conferees feared 
that S. 1075 might result in the issuance of injunctions against 
federal agency action which in any manner violated a citizen's 
"fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." 
Some consideration should be given to the words "funda-
mental and inalienable right." Language of this type is generally 
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used to describe constitutional rights enjoyed by citizens. It is 
unclear whether the Senate bill employed the term in this sense. 
If this is what S. 1075 intended, the question arises whether 
Congress can articulate constitutional rights by legislative pro-
nouncement. It is generally assumed that the judiciary alone is 
competent to interpret the Constitution. Quite the contrary, 
however, is true. Congress is a proper body for constitutional 
interpretation and its standing in this regard is not affected by 
the assumed power of the Supreme Court of finality in declaring 
consti tu tional in terpreta tions. 
It is emphasized that the national policy enunciated in NEPA 
was designed to ensure that federal action does not contribute to 
environmental problems. Section 101 (a), therefore, recognizes 
"the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of 
all components of the natural environment, particularly the 
profound influences of population growth, high density urbani-
zation, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and 
expanding technological advances .... "12 The report of the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which held 
hearings on the bill, provides a more specific description of the 
types of problems that NEPA was designed to solve: 
Examples of the rising public concern over the manner in which 
Federal policies and activities have contributed to environmental de-
cay and degradation may be seen in the Santa Barbara oil well blow-
out; the current controversy over the lack of an assured water supply 
and the impact of a super-jet airport on the Everglades National 
Parks; the proliferation of pesticides and other chemicals; the indis-
criminate siting of steam fired power-plants and other units of heavy 
industry; the pollution of the Nation's rivers, bays, lakes, and es-
tuaries; the loss of publicly owned seashores, open spaces, and other 
irreplaceable natural assets to industry, commercial users and de-
velopers; rising levels of air pollution; federally sponsored or aided 
construction activities such as highways, airports, and other public 
work projects which proceed without reference to the desires and 
aspirations of local people. 
* * * 
S.1075 is designed to deal with many of the basic causes of these in-
creasingly troublesome and often critical problems of domestic policy. 
* * * 
S.1075 is also designed to deal with the long-range implications of 
many of the critical environmental problems which have caused great 
public concern in recent years.13 
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To attain these objectives, the national environmental policy 
set forth in NEPA focuses on both "restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality" in section 101(a), and further empha-
sizes, in section 2, its introductory general policy section, that 
one of the purposes of the Act is "to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere 
and stimulate the health and welfare of man .... "14 This dual 
focus on prevention and elimination of environmental damage 
is supported by other provisions of the Act which impose sub-
stantive and procedural duties on federal officials to implement 
the national environmental policy by rectifying past instances 
of environmental abuse as well as by preventing future abuse. 
The substantive duties are set forth in sections 102 and 103 of 
the Act and require separate consideration. For purposes of 
analysis and comprehension, it is also important to distinguish 
the procedural duties which also are largely set forth in the same 
two sections. Accordingly, both types of duties are treated 
separately, as is the language of the statutory provisions them-
selves in the following three subsections of this article. 
B. Substantive Duties Under the Act 
The most important provision of the Act, and the one most 
debated in Congress, appears in section 102(1) which contains 
the following provision: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United 
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the 
policies set forth in this chapter .... 15 
The significance and impact of this provision depend upon the 
interpretation accorded the clause, "to the fullest extent pos-
sible," which modifies all section 102 duties. It seems clear both 
from the language of the Act16 and its legislative history17 that 
the modifying clause was intended to make the duties mandatory, 
not discretionary. The legislative history concerning the purpose 
of the modifying phrase is summarized in the Conference Report 
on the substitute bill which was enacted: 
The conference substitute provides that the phrase "to the fullest 
extent" possible [in section 102] applies with respect to those actions 
which Congress authorizes and directs to be done under both clauses 
(1) and (2) of section 102 (in the Senate Bill, the phrase applied only 
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to the directive in clause (1)). In accepting this change to section 102 
(and also to the provisions of section 103), the House conferees agreed 
to delete section 9 of the House amendment from the conference sub-
stitute. Section 9 of the House amendment provided that "nothing 
in this Act shall increase, decrease or change any responsibility or 
authority of any Federal official or agency created by other provision 
of law." In receding from this House provision in favor of the less re-
strictive provision "to the fullest extent possible" the House con-
ferees are of the view that the new language does not in any way limit 
the congressional authorization and directive to all agencies of the 
Federal Government set out in subparagraphs (A) through (II) of 
clause (2) of section 102 ... 17. The purpose of the new language is to 
make it clear that each agency of the Federal Government shall com-
ply with the directives set out in such subparagraphs (A) through 
(H) unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations 
expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the 
directives impossible. If such is found to be the case, then compliance 
with the particular directive is not immediately required. However, 
as to other activities of that agency, compliance is required. Thus, it 
is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest extent 
possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of 
avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102. 
Rather, the language in section 102 is intended to assure that all 
agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives 
set out in said section "to the fullest extent possible" under their stat-
utory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an excessively 
narrow construction of its existing statutory authorization to avoid 
compliance.Is 
It seems clear throughout the legislative history of the Act 
the the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" was inserted to 
require that agencies implement the national environmental 
policy unless precluded from doing so by statute.19 Thus, if 
implementation of NEPA policy is possible, the agency must 
comply with the section 102 duty. Where full implementation 
of the policy is impossible because a portion of it is precluded by 
statute, the agency is excused from full implementation. How-
ever, it still has the responsibility to comply insofar as possible.20 
It is only when an agency determines that it is precluded by 
the statute governing its jurisdiction and activities from imple-
menting the national environmental policy, in whole or in part, 
that it is excused from complying with the section 102 duties.21 
In this event, however, section 103 requires the agency to "pro-
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pose to the President, not later than July 1, 1971, such measures 
as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into 
conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures se.t forth 
in this chapter." Detailed examination of the provisions of sec-
tion 103 is deferred to the next subsection of this article. How-
ever, one salient point will be noted. Senator Henry Jackson, 
sponsor of NEPA and Chairman of the Senate Interior and In-
sular Affairs Committee, observed: 
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we do not intend, 
as a government or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the 
continued existence or the health of mankind: That we will not in-
tentionally initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the 
air, land, and water which support life on earth.22 
The duties imposed by section 102 apply to a broad range of 
action. All federal officials and agencies,23 including independent 
regulatory commissions,24 with the exception of environmental 
protection agencies,25 must comply. Thus, all decisions and ac-
tions which affect the environment, including those supported 
by federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, and other forms of 
funding assistance, as well as those which involve federal leases, 
licenses or permits, must comply with the national environ-
mental policy except to the extent compliance is precluded by 
statute.26 
Perhaps the full impact of this extensive coverage can be seen 
most clearly in the way NEPA will affect the operation and de-
cision making of those federal agencies which have no environ-
mental responsibility under existing law. 
Many older operating agencies of the Federal Government, for ex-
ample, do not at present have a mandate within the body of their 
enabling laws to allow them to give adequate attention to environ-
mental values. In other agencies, especially when the expenditure of 
funds is involved, an official's latitude to deviate from narrow policies 
or "the most economical alternative" to achieve an environmental 
goal may be strictly circumscribed by congressional authorizations 
which have overlooked existing or potential environmental problems 
or the limitations of agency procedures. There is also reason for seri-
ous concern over the activities of those agencies which do not feel 
they have sufficient authority to undertake needed research and ac-
tion to enhance, preserve, and maintain the qualitative side of the 
environment in connection with development activities. 
S.1075, as reported by the committee, would provide all agencies 
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and all federal officials with a legislative mandate and a responsibil-
ity to consider the consequences of their actions on the environment. 
This would be true of the licensing functions of independent agencies 
as well as the ongoing activi ties of the regular federal agencies. 27 
One of the major purposes and accomplishments of NEPA, as 
Senator Henry Jackson has pointed out, is that it "provides a 
statutory foundation to which administrators may refer ... for 
guidance in making decisions which find environmental values 
in conflict with other values."28 Federal officials must thoroughly 
analyze the impact of all proposed actions on the environment. 
Thus, two decisions must be made. Initially, it must be deter-
mined whether the proposed action will have any significant 
environmental impact and, subsequently, whether there exists 
any conflict with or between environmental values and other 
values. In this regard, the procedural "action-forcing" require-
ments of section 102(2), especially the provisions of subpara-
graphs (C) and (D), become most important. Both of these pro-
visions are discussed in detail in the following section. 
It seems clear that one of the main purposes of these pro-
cedural "action-forcing" provisions was to establish a restruc-
turing of the decision-making process and to accomplish a re-
ordering of priorities. One observer has even suggested that they 
go so far as to shift the burden of proof to the proponen t of action 
which would disturb the environment.29 The following state-
ment of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
offers support to this view: 
As a result of ... failure to formulate a comprehensive national 
policy, environmental decision making largely continues to proceed 
as it has in the past. Policy is established by default and inaction. 
Environmental problems are only dealt with when they reach crisis 
proportions. Public desires and aspirations are seldom consulted. 
Important decisions concerning the use and the shape of man's future 
environment continue to be made in small but steady increments 
which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of pre-
vious decades. Today it is clear that we cannot continue on this 
course.SO 
The provisions analyzed here, if enthusiastically accepted and 
implemented by federal officials, could have far-reaching na-
tional and transnational consequences. Not only could con-
servation values become accepted for their own merit, but the 
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history of industralized, developed societies in depleting the 
irreplaceable resources of their own and other countries at an 
alarming rate might be reversed. Unfortunately, as the recent 
interim report issued by the Department of the Interior on the 
trans-Alaskan oil pipeline controversy indicates, this reversal 
does not appear to be the necessarily emerging result. The oppo-
sition of the newly created Environmental Protection Agency to 
this interim position, however, suggests that proposed federal 
action must have a strong base when it becomes inconsistent 
with the national environmental policy. Moreover, NEPA has 
not been entirely ineffective in obtaining favorable judicial 
in terpreta tion. 
C. Procedural Duties Under the Act 
Briefly stated, all agencies of the federal government are re-
quired by section 102(2), "to include in every recommendation 
or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
actions significantly effecting (sic.) the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement" on certain specified environ-
mental considerations. Prior to making the detailed statement, 
the responsible federal official is required to consult and obtain 
the comments of any federal agency which has jurisdiction by 
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental im-
p~~t involved. In full, section 102(2) contains the following pro-
ViSions: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: ... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will 
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the 
environmental design arts in planning and in decision making 
which may have an impact on man's environment; 
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consulta-
tion with the Council on Environmental Quality established by 
subchapter II of this Chapter, which will insure that presently un-
quantified environmental amenities and values may be given ap-
propriate consideration in decision making along with economic 
and technical considerations; 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the 
responsible official on-
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(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented. 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal 
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal 
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise wi th re-
spect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such state-
ment and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, 
State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and en-
force environmental standards, shall be made available to the 
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public 
as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the pro-
posal through the existing agency review processes; 
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to 
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves 
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available re-
sources; 
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of envi-
ronmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy 
of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, reso-
lutions, and programs designed to maximize international coopera-
ation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of 
mankind's world environment; 
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institu-
tions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, 
maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment; 
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning 
and development of resource-oriented projects; and 
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by 
subchapter II of this chapter. 
The overlap and interrelationship between these procedural 
"action-forcing" provisions and the substantive duties discussed 
above is at once apparent. While each of the subparagraph pro-
visions is important, detailed attention is given here only to 
subparagraphs (C), (D) and (F) because of their particular po-
tential for reordering priorities. 
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Section 102(2) (C) requires that a "detailed statement" be pre-
pared by the agency whenever "legislative proposals" or "other 
major Federal action" is involved. This provision does not seem 
intended to imply that the environmental impact of agency ac-
tion may be ignored in other instances. The stated policies of 
sections 2 and 101, and the duty imposed by section 102(1), 
require that adverse environmental impact be considered even 
where section 102(2) (C) statements are not required. Otherwise 
federal agencies and officials could not attain the Act's dual 
objectives of "restoring and maintaining environmental qual-
ity"31 by rectifying past instances of environmental abuse as well 
as by preventing future abuse. 32 
Subparagraphs (C) (iii) and (D) of section 102 (2) become par-
ticularly important where adverse environmental effects will re-
sult from proposed action, and also where it is possible to restore 
environmental quality previously lost. Under these provisions, 
the federal agency or official must consider alternatives to the 
proposed action. Under section 102(2)(D), federal agencies and 
officials have the responsibility to "study, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in 
any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning 
alternative uses of available resources." 
This language suggests that the consideration of alternatives 
must be as thorough as the consideration of environmental im-
pact. If an environmentally harmless alternative exists, it must 
be adopted instead of the original proposal. Where the proposal 
has no alternative compatible with the national environmental 
policy, the legislative history suggests that federal officials and 
agencies have the responsibility to reassess the justification for 
the proposed action. Particularly pertinent to this point is 
Senator Jackson's statement that environmentally destructive 
activity be permitted only infrequently: "This basic principle of 
the policy is that we must strive in all that we do, to achieve a 
standard of excellence in man's relationships to his physical 
surroundings. If there are to be departures from this standard of 
excellence, they should be exceptions to the rule and the policy. 
And, as exceptions, they will have to be justified in the light of 
public scrutiny as required by section 102."33 As one commenta-
tor has stated: 
Even if an agency succeeds in proving that an environmentally de-
structive action is justified, its responsibility does not end. The 
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agency must then take all possible steps to minimize the adverse ef-
fects of its action. This conclusion flows from the application of the 
national environmental policy to all of the subordinate decisions af-
ter the initial decision is made. A consideration of alternative tech-
niques of implementing the decision is especially important at this 
stage of the decision-making process.34 
The provisions of subparagraph (F) and the second part of 
subparagraph (C) of section 102(2) are particularly relevant to 
state environmental action. These two provisions would give 
state governments and their agencies, private institutions and 
citizens access to federal agency records which are relevant to 
the protection of the environment as well as to the statements 
required to be filed by section 102(2)(C). The impact of sub-
paragraphs (C) and (F) in this regard is quite important since 
the benefits of the duties imposed upon the federal government 
by the remaining provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (H) 
of section 102(2) are made available to all environmentally 
concerned parties. At the present time, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality, created by Title II of NEPA, has adopted the 
position of not making the environmental impact statements of 
other federal agencies public until it has prepared and submitted 
its own comment on the statements. As a practical matter, this 
means that parties not consulted by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency under subparagraph (C) do not have a chance to 
participate in the agency's evaluation or to influence its decision. 
The Council's position in declining to make the environmental 
impact statements available until it has prepared and submitted 
its own comment is based upon the absence of explicit time pro-
visions for making the data available under the Freedom of 
Information Act. 3S Its position in distinguishing between en-
vironmental impact statements which are "drafts" and those 
which are "final," has generated strong criticism.36 As the 
Environmental Law Institute has stated: 
[T]he Council is free to guarantee early public access to "detailed" 
102(2) (C) statements. In light of this Presidential directive [Execu-
tive Order 11514] it seems anomalous that the public should now be 
last in the hierarchy of consultation behind federal, state and local 
agencies, especially when the way is open under the act to put the 
public on an equal footing with them. (Also, when read literally 
NEPA requires that the President, the Council and the public be 
given contemporaneous access to the statements.)37 
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Prior to the passage of NEPA, planning and decision making of 
the federal government and private industry was all too fre-
quently "the exclusive province of the engineer and cost an-
alyst."38 These people often ignored environmental factors be-
cause of the difficulty in evaluating them quantitatively in the 
same equation with the economic and technical factors motivat-
ing proposed action.39 NEPA now requires that federal agencies 
and officials strive to develop the methodology and techniques 
necessary for determining the value and importance of environ-
mental factors. This can be seen in the various other subpara-
graphs of section 102(2). Subparagraph (A), for example, spe-
cifically states that federal agencies are to "utilize a systematic 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use 
of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts," and subparagraph (B) imposes upon them the further duty 
to "identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will 
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and 
values may be given appropriate consideration in decision mak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations." The 
further duty to "initiate and utilize ecological information in the 
planning and development of resource-oriented projects" is im-
posed by subparagraph (G). Finally, NEPA recognizes that the 
duty to rectify ecological abuse and to maintain environmental 
quality must be viewed in its proper international or trans-
national perspective. The provisions of subparagraph (E) require 
federal agencies and officials to "lend appropriate support to 
initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize 
international cooperation" whenever cooperation is consistent 
with the foreign policy of the United States. 
These procedural requirements are particularly important to 
conservationists and environmentalists. They are now assured 
that the necessary energy of government will be devoted to the 
developmen t of heretofore unknown data bearing upon their 
concerns. They have won their initial victory. NEPA now pro-
vides that full investigation and consideration must be accorded 
ecological factors, along with economic and technological factors, 
in order to fulfill the country's responsibility to succeeding 
generations to maintain and enhance environmental quality. 
Regrettably, much of these data may not be made available to 
concerned public and private institutions and individuals be-
cause of the Council's position in distinguishing between draft 
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and final statements which it conceivably might apply to the 
other ecological data collected and prepared by federal agencies. 
D. Agency Review oj Existing Operations 
The final provision of the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 which is important to the present analysis is contained 
in section 103. This section provides that all agencies of the 
federal government shall review their present statutory author-
ity, administrative regulations, current policies and procedures 
to determine whether any deficiencies or inconsistencies exist 
which prohibit full compliance with the national environmental 
policy. Prior to July 1, 1971, these agencies are to propose to the 
President measures necessary to bring their authority and 
policies into conformity with the intent, purposes and procedures 
set forth in NEP A. In its interim guidelines, the Council of 
Environmental Quality advanced this date to September 1, 
1970, and these statements have been prepared by all principal 
agencies and have been publicly disclosed.40 
As noted above, the question arises as to the relationship be-
tween sections 103 and 102 of the Act, particularly in light of 
the clear statement in section 10541 that the Act is supplemental 
and does not repeal existing legislation. In response to these 
inquiries, it is necessary to underscore one fact. Section 103 is not 
intended to provide federal agencies and officials with an escape 
from the duties imposed by section 102. It was emphasized dur-
ing the debates on the Conference compromise bill that the pro-
visions of section 102 "direct any Federal agency which takes 
action that it must take into account environmental manage-
ment and environmental quality considerations."42 The section 
was "designed to assure consideration of environmental matters 
by all agencies in their planning and decision making-especially 
those agencies who now have little or no legislative authority to 
take environmental considerations into account."43 
From the Conference Committee Report, it appears that sec-
tion 103 is to have application only when there is "a clear con-
fEct between [an agency's] existing statutory authority" and 
NEPA.44 Although federal agencies are not to construe their 
present statutory authority in an "unduly narrow manner," it is 
also clear that they are not to construe their statutory authority 
in a manner which will avoid full compliance with the Act. Thus, 
section 103 has application, and federal agencies are to recom-
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mend changes under it, only when a provision of their enabling 
statutes "clearly precludes full compliance with the act."45 
The text of the section 103 statements which have been filed 
does not a:ppear to present as many inconsistencies and de-
ficiencies between NEPA objectives and the goal of other federal 
legislation as some observers had anticipated.46 
E. Case Law Under the Act 
It is now only a little over a year from the effective date of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The paucity of 
cases dealing with NEPA has left unanswered many questions 
which only judicial interpretation can ultimately resolve. Three 
of these questions are of sufficient importance to the prospective 
impact of the Act to warrant raising them here: (1) whether 
judicial review is precluded under NEPA or whether the duties 
imposed by the Act are legally cognizable; (2) what plaintiffs 
or classes of plaintiffs have standing to enforce the Act's pro-
visions; and (3) whether the Act was intended to be, or will be, 
applied retrospectively. 
1. 'Judicial Review Under NEP A 
The question as to whether a plaintiff has standing under a 
statute to assert his claim should be distinguished from the 
question as to whether Congress intended to preclude judicial 
review of administrative findings under that statute. The general 
rule as to the latter question is that judicial review is not pre-
cluded absent a clear manifestation of congressional intent to do 
so. Since no such express intent is manifested in NEPA, this 
initial issue would seem settled. Moreover, as the ensuing dis-
cussion illustrates, no action which has relied upon NEPA as the 
basis of a cause of action has yet been dismissed on the ground 
that judicial review was precluded by the statute itself. 
However, there remains the other more difficult threshold 
question whether NEPA creates any legally cognizable duties. 
Since section 102(1) states expressly that "the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted 
in accordance with the policies set forth" in NEPA "to the fullest 
extent possible," this second question also would seem to be 
resolved. Nevertheless, at least one court has indicated that 
NEPA was not intended to create any legally cognizable rights 
or duties. In Bucklein v. Volpe,47 the court stated: 
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Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Environmental Policy 
Act can serve as the basis for a cause of action. Aside from establish-
ing the Council, the Act is simply a declaration of Congressional 
policy; as such it would seem not to create any rights or impose any 
duties of which a court can take cognizance. There is only this general 
command to federal officials to use all practicable means to enhance 
the environment.48 
With all due deference to the Bucklein court, it is submitted that 
this interpretation ignores the legislative history of NEPA and, 
in particular, the section 102(1) requirement that all "public 
laws" of the United States, as well as "policies and regulations," 
be "interpreted and administered" in accordance with the national 
environmental policy "to the fullest extent possible" unless pre-
cluded by statute from doing so. (Emphasis added.)49 In the final 
analysis, this mandate would seem to be enforceable only by 
courts whose duty it is to interpret the law. 
Although it also contains a rather narrow construction of 
NEPA, the decision of the court in Ely v. Velde50 stands in con-
trast to that of the Bucklein court. In Ely, plaintiffs sought 
permanently to enjoin the building of a medical center for 
Virginia prisoners in a "uniquely historic" rural area of the state 
where plain tiffs resided. Part of the cost of the center was to be 
paid by the federal government under the Safe Streets Act.51 In 
approving the grant of moneys under this Act, the federal Law 
Enforcement Assistance Association (LEAA) admittedly did not 
consider the environmental impact of the proposed construction 
on the area. Alleging violations of both the National Historic 
Preservation Act52 and NEPA, plaintiffs brought suit under the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.53 Although the 
court denied plaintiffs the relief requested, it held the case 
cognizable both under the National Historic Preservation Act 
and under NEPA. 
The confusion caused the judiciary by the language of section 
102(1) is apparent from the decision on the merits in the Ely case. 
In denying the injunction, the court based its holding upon the 
determination that NEPA is a "discretionary" statute while the 
Safe Streets Act was "non-discretionary," and, therefore, the 
LEAA officials administering the Safe Streets Act did not have 
to comply with NEPA.54 The court admitted that "the Congress 
did not intend the clause in [section 102] 'to the fullest extent 
possible' to be an escape provision" but, nevertheless, concluded 
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that the NEPA obligation to consider environmental impact "is 
discretionary only."55 In reaching its decision, the court relied 
upon language in the Safe Streets Act which provided that "the 
Administration shall make grants ... to a state planning agency 
if such agency has on file ... an approved comprehensive state 
I "56 pan .... 
This seems an unduly narrow construction of the Act in face of 
the clear congressional intent to accomplish a reordering of na-
tional priorities. As indicated above, this intent is manifested 
both in the legislative history and in the language of NEPA. If 
Congress intended to create only discretionary directives, why 
was it so careful to point out in the several committee reports 
and in the debates that the phrase modifying section 102 was 
not intended to create an escape hatch, and that "each agency 
of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set 
out in [section 102] unless the existing law applicable to such 
agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance 
with one of the directives impossible"? (Emphasis added.)57 Why 
did it use the terms "authorizes and directs that, to the fullest 
extent possible ... [the] public laws of the United States shall be 
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set 
forth in this chapter" and that "all agencies of the Federal 
Government shall" abide by the provisions of subparagraphs 
(A) through (H) of section 102(2)? (Emphasis added.) 
It would appear that NEPA contains as much mandatory lan-
guage as the Safe Streets Act. As the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas stated in its opinion in 
Texas Committee v. United States: "It is hard to imagine a clearer 
or stronger mandate to the Courts."58 The Ely court's distinction 
between "discretionary" and "non-discretionary" statutes as ap-
plied in the case is poorly founded.59 
Apart from this deficiency, it seems clear that the decision in 
Ely falls far short of implementing NEPA policy "to the fullest 
extent possible." It would have been much more consistent with 
the spiri t and language of NEP A for the court to have ordered 
LEAA to consider the environmental consequences of its action. 
This position would not make implementation of the Safe Streets 
Act objectives impossible, but would help to make them com-
patible with other federal policy objectives. A more preferable 
interpretation of the two statutes would have resulted. It would 
seem that in approving a plan, a federal agency should be re-
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quired to consider the matters Congress directed it to consider in 
a statute clearly designed to establish a comprehensive environ-
men tal program. 
Each of the points made in criticism of the Ely decision seems 
particularly well articulated in the following thoughtful extract 
from the Texas Committee opinion: 
The Congress has expressed in strong and clear language their 
concern over what we are doing to our environment. In the language 
of the statute, Congress has recognized the "critical importance of 
restoring and maintaining environmental quality." In very repetitive 
language, Congress has made clear that it intends to "use all practical 
means and measures ... to preserve" the "natural aspects of our 
national heritage, and maintain wherever possible, an environment 
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice." Further-
more, the Congress: 
authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the 
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be 
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set 
forth in this Act. Sec. 102. 
I t is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the Courts ... 
It should also be pointed out here that the Congress in mandatory 
language requires all federal agencies to undertake, to the fullest 
extent possible, measures to insure protection and preservation of the 
environment, consistent, of course, with other economic and social 
requirements and goals .... 60 
2. Standing Under NEP A 
Because NEPA contains no express standing provisions, the 
issue of standing under the Act is largely unresolved, and this 
article will not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the problem. 
Some observations, however, are appropriate. 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Association oj Data Pro-
cessing Service Organizations v. Camp61 lays down the standing 
test for a plaintiff whose complaint is grounded on a federal 
statute. First, he must allege that "the challenged action [or 
inaction] has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."62 
Second, he must place the interest he seeks to protect "arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated, by the 
statute ... in question."63 
If one adopts the more likely result that judicial review of ad-
ministrative findings is not precluded under NEPA, then the 
application of the Data Processing test would seem to demand the 
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result that all legitimate representatives of the public have stand-
ing to enforce NEP A in the courts. This result follows from the 
recently expanded view64 of standing taken by federal courts and 
from the intent of the statute itself. First, it now seems accepted 
that the interest of a public representative which is injured in 
fact need not be economic,65 but can reflect "aesthetic, con-
servational and recreational values."66 Second, since NEPA is 
clearly designed to protect the public interest in environmental 
quality, that same public interest must necessarily be "within 
the zone of interest to be protected" by NEPAY This is the 
position adopted in the Ely case where the court held that NEPA 
was a relevant statute within the meaning of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and that the plaintiffs, who were residents of the 
affected area, were within the class sought to be protected by the 
Act. The court held that they satisfied the Data Processing test 
"not only [because of] injury to their personal interest, but also, 
acting as private attorneys general, [because of] injury to the 
public interest;" they were clearly within the zone of interests 
protected by the relevant statute, NEPA.68 
This view that all representatives of the public have standing 
to enforce the mandates of NEPA has already been espoused by 
at least one commentator69 and is undoubtedly the better view. 70 
Nevertheless, it is not alone conclusive of the problems in the 
area of public representation, the foremost of which is the process 
the courts will ultimately use to determine which persons or 
groups justifiably can be said to represent the public interest. 71 
Despite the Ely decision, the truly perplexing question of 
standing under NEPA exists with respect to the private litigant. 
The difficulty arises from some interesting considerations. Federal 
courts have favored having before them the specific plaintiff or 
plaintiffs who directly suffered from the injuries alleged in the 
complaint. The policy favoring this approach is that the specific 
plain tiff or plain tiffs will presen t the factual issues in their most 
concrete and adversary form. 72 Where a statute is expressly in-
tended to protect a public interest, however, opposite policy 
considerations become operative. Now, it is impossible to antici-
pate having specific individuals who have suffered unique 
damage. Their injury would be of the same quality as that 
suffered by other citizens, though there probably will be differ-
ences in degree. In these cases, therefore, the judicial interest 
must be to have before the court a litigant capable, both in re-
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sources and sophistication, of eliciting facts relevant to large-
scale environmental damage or deterioration. These demands 
may, in fact, be beyond the abilities of most private litigants. 
Courts would do well to consider these distinctions when called 
upon to resolve the question of standing under NEPA. At the 
minimum, it certainly is arguable that since the statute is silent, 
a private party has standing to enforce NEPA's directives. This 
is the conclusion reached by the court in the Ely case. If the 
public has sustained damage in fact to an environmental in-
terest, a fortiori, so has the individual, at least an individual 
residing in or otherwise using the area affected by the environ-
mentally harmful activity. It is a contradiction to argue that the 
damage to the public is more specific than the damage to the 
individual. If the public is within the zone of interest to be 
protected by NEPA, as the Ely court held, so also is the private 
individual. However, while this conclusion is logically required, 
it does not automatically follow that private citizens can always 
qualify as public representatives. In this connection, it is inter-
esting to note the statement of the Ely court that "[t]he plaintiffs, 
even when acting in the public interest as private attorneys 
general, cannot purport to substitute their standard of public 
need for that lawfully designated to [the appropriate state 
official]." 73 
3. Retrospective Application 
Probably the most important question concerning NEPA 
which remains unresolved is whether the Act will receive retro-
spective application. At the one extreme, if NEPA is held to be 
fully retroactive, all federal administrative agency decisions 
made before January 1, 1970 must be brought into conformity 
with the Act's directives. At the other extreme, prospective 
application alone would mean that all decisions made prior to 
NEPA's effective date would stand regardless of their environ-
mentally destructive effects. A middle ground would see deci-
sions pre-dating the Act essentially remain unaffected, except for 
administrative review on the question of how best to minimize 
possibly undesirable consequences. 74 Pending resolution by the 
Supreme Court, determination of retroactive application remains 
an open question. 
In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett,75 the court 
was asked to enjoin construction of a road approved by the 
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Secretary of Transportation which allegedly would affect a trout 
stream. 76 In dismissing the request for the injunction, the court 
considered the issue of the retroactivity of NEPA: 
[T]he most reasonable interpretation that can be given to the legisla-
tive history of the Act is that there is no manifest Congressional in-
tention or unequivocal and inflexible impact in the language used to 
indicate that the Act should be applied retroactively. Indeed, if the 
language of the Act favors any position, it most likely favors non-
retroacti vi ty. 77 
The court cited the language of Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie 
Stock Yards CO.,18 that" 'the first rule of construction is that 
legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to 
the past, ... [and] a retrospective operation will not be given 
to a statute ... unless such be the unequivocal and inflexible 
import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legisla-
ture.' "79 
The court in Bartlett also seemed to construe the language of 
NEPA narrowly. It read the phrases "to use all practicable 
means and resources" and "to the fullest extent possible" in 
sections 101 and 102 as indicating a lack of retroactive intent on 
the part of Congress. 80 This interpretation does not seem war-
ranted by the legislative history.81 
In Bartlett, the plaintiff cited the Texas Committee case for the 
proposition that NEPA should be applied retroactively. This 
contention was rejected on two grounds; first, that the language 
referred to by plaintiff was dictum and, second, that the cases 
were actually distinguishable. The court noted that in Texas 
Committee no construction had yet begun, while it had in Bartlett. 
The court's consideration seems limited to what the Department 
of Transportation statutorily was required to consider at the 
time the contract was awarded. Since this was finalized prior to 
the passage of NEPA, it concluded that no violation of the Act 
occurred. This approach seems to ignore the complete transaction. 
No federal money had yet been paid and construction had 
only just begun. Thus, the court easily could have applied the 
dictates of NEPA to the remainder of the construction, thereby 
achieving a harmonization of the two federal programs without 
necessarily defeating the purposes of either. This harmonization 
was favorably received in Texas Committee. 
The case of Zabel v. Tabb 82 would seem, at first glance, to indi-
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cate that the prospects for applying NEPA retroactively are 
significant. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held proper the deci-
sion of the Army Corps of Engineers to deny a license for a wet-
lands fill project on the grounds that the project would have 
adverse environmental impact. In so holding, the court intro-
duced the directives of NEPA to support its conclusion that the 
Corps' denial on non-navigational grounds was within its 
authority. Since the Corps first recommended denial of the 
license in 1966, it would seem that the court had applied NEPA 
retroactively: 
Although this Congressional command was not in existence at the 
time the permit in question 'was denied, the correctness of that deci-
sion must be determined by the applicable standards oj today. (Emphasis 
added.) The national policy is set forth in plain terms in §101 and the 
disclaimer of §104(3) neither affects it nor the duty of all departments 
to consider, consult, collaborate and conclude. For we hold that while 
it is still the action of the Secretary of the Army on the recommenda-
tion of the Chief of Engineers, the Army must consult with, consider 
and receive, and then evaluate the recommendations of all of these 
other agencies particularly on all these environmental factors ... 
Rather in weighing the application, the Secretary of the Army is 
acting under a Congressional mandate to collaborate and consider all 
of these factors. 83 
While the position of the court on the question of retroactivity is 
clear, the existence of alternative grounds for its holding makes 
the real basis for the decision doubtful. 84 
E. Summary 
As indicated, sections 102(1) and (2) are designed to operate 
within the policy objectives set forth in sections 2 and 101. Read 
together as an integrated pattern (as indeed they must be read 
since they are but individual sections of a single statute) these 
several provisions impose on all federal agencies and officials the 
responsibility to take into account the environmental impact of 
their activity, and to implement the national environmental 
policy "to the fullest extent possible." 
The provisions of sections 102, 103, 104 and 105, and particu-
larly the modifying language "to the fullest extent possible" 
contained in section 102, make it clear that the National En-
vironmental Policy Act is intended to "supplement" rather than 
"modify or repeal" the existing statutory authority of federal 
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agencies. Yet, at the same time, it is clear that NEPA is intended 
to require federal agencies and officials to follow its policies, goals 
and procedures unless their existing statutory authorizations 
clearly prohibit full compliance with the Act's directives. When 
this conflict occurs, section 103 becomes operative. Under this 
section reports have already been made to the President recom-
mending legislative changes needed to harmonize the competing 
policy objectives. 
The extent to which subsequent case law will implement the 
policy goals of the Act is not yet clear. The Supreme Court has 
not had occasion to consider any of these questions arising under 
NEPA, and, consequently, they remain open issues. Indeed, there 
is little judicial indication as to the meaning of the Act because 
only a short time has elapsed since its passage, and the surfacing 
of the problems which have arisen as to its retrospective applica-
tion. From the few cases discussed here, it is apparent that only 
after extensive litigation and judicial decisions will the meaning 
of the disputed section of NEPA, its standing requirements, and 
its relationship to the Administrative Procedure Act and other 
federal statutes, be resolved. 
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT OF 1970 
Another important provision ~ith respect to the environment 
is included in the Environmenta1 '0.uality Improvement Act of 
1970, which was approved on April 3, 1970. The Act begins with 
a statement of Congressional Findings in section 202(a), which 
are: 
(1) that man has caused changes in the environment; 
(2) that many of these changes may affect the relationship between 
man and his environment; and 
(3) that population increases and urban concentration contribute 
directly to pollution and degradation of our environment 
The Act then states in section 202(b)(1) that "the Congress 
declares that there is a national policy for the environment which 
provides for the enhancement of the environmental quality," 
and further provides in section 202(b)(2) that "[t]he primary 
responsibility for implementing this policy rests with State and 
local governments." Section 202(c) states that the purposes of 
the Act are twofold: first, "to assure that each Federal depart-
ment and agency conducting or supporting public works activ-
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ities which affect the environment shall implement the policies 
established under existing laws;" and second, to establish an 
Office of Environmental Quality which shall pnwide professional 
and administrative staff for the Council on Environmental 
Quality established by the National Environmental Policy Act. 
The relationship between these two agencies is explained below. 
Additionally, the Act serves to underscore the critical impor-
tance of state and local activity in the fight to restore and main-
tain environmental quality. By its own language, the Act recog-
nizes the futility of inaction by these political institutions while 
hopefully awaiting federal restoration of the environment. In the 
final analysis, Congress has properly deemed that state and local 
governments must act. 
IV. REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
Since the presen t administration took office on January 20, 
1969, it has reorganized the federal bureaucracy with respect to 
environmental pollution. The first organizational step taken by 
the President was the establishment of the now defunct "Cabinet 
Committee on the Environment,"85 by Executive Order No. 
11472 on May 29, 1969. The Cabinet Committee was chaired by 
the President and consisted of the Secretaries of the Depart-
ments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Interior, 
and Transportation. Its functions were to promote the preserva-
tion of the environment, to be aware of the effects of federal pro-
grams on the environment, and to coordinate governmental 
programs concerning the environment. 
At best, the Cabinet Committee on the Environment was a 
stop-gap measure which did not produce any significant results. 
The inability of the Cabinet Committee to achieve or enhance 
environmental quality was predictable. Cabinet committees 
often prove ineffective for several reasons. The Secretaries' time 
is already overburdened with the administration of their own 
departments. Moreover, Secretaries usually hesitate to criticize 
the work of the other departments. Another more important 
reason, however, is that the Cabinet Committee was not an 
adequate method by which to resolve the conflicts of interests 
existing within the individual departments. For example, the 
Department of Agriculture traditional!y has been responsible 
for the inherently contradictory task 0 promoting agriculture, 
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on the one hand, and of controlling pesticides and herbicides, on 
the other. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Commission was charged 
with the conflicting duties of promoting the peaceful uses of 
nuclear power and, at the same time, of protecting the environ-
ment against the hazards of radioactive pollution. The Cabinet 
Committee could not cope with problems of this genre. The 
history of intra-cabinet disputes has been one of jealous guarding 
of jurisdiction and responsibility in order to insure continued 
political importance and expansion. A firmer organizational 
commitment to the preservation and renovation of the environ-
ment was necessary to rectify these conflicts and the resultant 
inadequacy inherent within the structure of the Cabinet Com-
mittee on the Environment. 
The first major commitment of this kind was made by Congress 
with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969. As previously noted, the Act required all federal agencies 
to notify the President of measures deemed necessary to bring 
their jurisdiction and program operations into conformity with 
the stated policies of the Act. It also established, within the 
Executive Office of the President, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality, a full-time three-member group charged with 
the responsibility of advising the President on environmental 
affairs. The Council on Environmental Quality is similar in form 
to the Council of Economic Advisors, and it was expected that 
it would achieve similar importance. 
The subsequently enacted Environmental Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970 enhanced the effectiveness of the Council by 
establishing the Office of Environmental Quality within the 
Executive Office of the President. The Office of Environmental 
Quality is the extension of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (the same person heads both bodies), and, as noted, provides 
professional and administrative staff in support of the Council. 
The action of Congress in passing the Environmental Improve-
ment Act of 1970 apparently did not comport with the wishes of 
the President. Upon signing NEPA into law, the President 
reportedly stated: 
The environmental advisors will be assisted by a compact staff in 
keeping me thoroughly posted on current problems and advising me 
on how the federal government can act to solve them. To leave no 
doubt that the word "compact" was carefully chosen, Mr. Nixon 
added: 
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I know that the Congress has before it a proposal to establish 
yet another staff organization to deal with environmental problems 
in the Executive Office of the President. I believe this would be a 
mistake. No matter how pressing the problem, to organize, to over-
staff or to compound the levels of review and advice seldom brings 
earlier or better results. 
Precisely, what the President had in mind for the Council is a 
matter known only to him .... 86 
Whatever may have been the President's intention, these two 
innovations, the Council, and the Office, of Environmental 
Quality, made the Cabinet Committee on the Environment 
superfluous, and its existence was terminated on July 1, 1970 by 
Executive Order No. 11541.87 The new environmental agencies 
should prove more effective than the Cabinet Committee be-
cause their status as separate entities with full-time operations 
and personnel places them in a better position to criticize the 
activities and programs of the various departments of govern-
ment. 
The remaining implementation of the declared national policies 
of NEPA was effectuated by a restructuring of the numerous 
federal agencies, departments and bureaus in order to parallel 
their organization with that of the single entity responsible for 
environmental affairs. This rearrangement was effected by the 
President in Reorganization Plans No. 388 and No. 489 which were 
issued on July 9, 1970, and became effective in September, 1970. 
Reorganization Plan No.3 created a "super-agency" known as 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Many scattered 
bureaus and administrations were transferred from the Depart-
ments of the Interior, HEW, Agriculture, and elsewhere to the 
newly created EPA. This restructuring eliminated many of the 
old conflicts of interests. Reorganization Plan No.3 does not 
define the relationship of the Executive Office with the EPA and 
the Council on Environmental Quality. The Council and the 
EPA are, however, separate, and the Administrator of the EPA 
is directly responsible only to the President. Moreover, the EPA 
is of such importance that it was established as an independent 
body rather than as a department of an existing agency, and it 
has been given authority over federal environmental programs. 
The Council, on the other hand, serves mainly to advise the 
President rather than to exercise power over federal agencies 
whose programs affect the environment. It does exercise con-
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siderable power, however, by establishing guidelines for federal 
action and has already required one agency to prepare a detailed 
environmental impact statement when the agency failed to do 
so on its own accord. 90 
Reorganization Plan No.4 established the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the 
Department of Commerce. This agency is also a consolidation of 
various activities previously handled by many bureaus of the 
several departments on a non-coordinated basis. 
The difference between the two newly created bodies is that 
the EPA is geared to respond quickly to common environmental 
threats (such as inland water pollution, radiation hazards, air 
pollution), while the NOAA is responsible for long-range plan-
ning in the preservation of the ocean and the atmosphere. 
Finally, at the close of the year, the Attorney General an-
nounced the creation of a new unit within the Department of 
Justice to strengthen enforcement of federal antipollution pro-
grams. The newly established Pollution Control Section is part 
of the Department's Division of Land and Natural Resources. 
It will be responsible for pursuing all litigation previously 
handled by the Lands Division and other sections within the 
Department of Justice, and will handle matters referred to it by 
the EPA and other departmen ts of the federal governmen t. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The above discussion illustrates that considerable administra-
tive changes have taken place. Some were accomplished by Con-
gress in refocusing national priorities. Others were effected by the 
executive branch both to avoid the conflicting responsibilities of 
government agencies and to centralize control over antipollution 
programs. While it is clear that these undertakings represent a 
significant step at the federal level in the newly instituted struggle 
to restore and maintain environmental quality, only the passage of 
time will indicate their degree of effectiveness. There is some 
question whether administrative changes alone can be effective. 
As distinguished an environmentalist as Professor Joseph L. 
Sax has stated his belief that environmental change cannot be 
accomplished through administrative processes: 
[T]he administrative process tends to produce not the voice of the 
people, but the voice of the bureaucrat-the administrative perspee-
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tive posing as the public interest. Simply put, the fact is that the citi-
zen does not need a bureaucratic middleman to identify, prosecute, 
and vindicate his interest in environmental quality. He is perfectly 
capable of fighting his own battles-if only he is given the tools with 
which to do the job. And ... battles are best fought out between those 
who have direct stakes in the outcome. 91 
Professor Sax argues that the bureaucratic middleman does not 
have the necessary direct stake in the outcome to fight the best 
battle, and all too often reflects the view of businessmen in the 
industry he is charged to regulate. Speaking to the several sug-
gestions that the reform movement include within agency prac-
tice the voice of "independent councils of experts, ombudsmen, 
negotiators, and so on," Profesor Sax finds them insufficient: 
"They only rearrange, or rename, the insider perspective which 
is at the root of the problem. They fail because they do not 
change the balance of power-precisely what the development of 
a scheme of enforceable legal rights, backed by judicial power, 
can do."92 Professor Sax's central thesis is that there is a "need 
to reassert citizen initiative in the management of our environ-
ment,"93 and this can be accomplished only by giving the citizen 
access to the courtroom, which Professor Sax argues, "is an 
eminently suitable forum for the voicing of citizen concerns over 
the maintenance of environmental quality."94 
This approach certainly differs from the approach of the ad-
ministrators and the main focus of the congressional concern as 
expressed in NEP A. Nevertheless, the few cases arising under 
that statute demonstrate that its provisions may support citizen 
participation in governmental decision making through the 
Judicial process. Whichever position is right-that of the regula-
tors for administrative reform or that of Professor Sax for in-
creased citizen litigation-the language contained in NEPA, 
arguably can serve as the foundation for each. 
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